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Introduction 
Each country of the Andean Region—Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela—faces 
its own particular set of challenges and problems. There is, however, a common set of challenges 
which include consolidating and deepening democratic institutions and practice, the cultivation or 
transit of illegal drugs, uncontrolled spaces inviting establishment of terrorist networks, and 
problematic relations between the armed forces and civilian government. While Ecuador is the 
smallest of these five countries, it embodies all of the region's problems.  
In this short essay, I will center the discussion of these problems around a focus on civil-military 
relations as both a cause and effect of other issues and challenges. Although Ecuador transited 
from military to civilian rule in 1979 after eight years of military governments, because of both the 
legacy of previous military rule and ongoing political instability, the military is periodically drawn 
into the maelstrom of politics. However, the institution remains unable to reform key structures, 
including the National Security Council, the peak intelligence organizations, and various other 
structures and legal processes, nor can it be utilized effectively against the regional, non-
traditional, threats of illegal drugs and terrorism. 
Regionalism and Political Paralysis 
Much of the political history of independent Ecuador can be explained by reference to the 
dynamic that originates in the political bargain arising from the need to balance the competing 
economic and political interests of the coast and the sierra. From colonial times, the competition 
and conflict between the coast, centered in Guayaquil, and the capital of the later independent 
republic, Quito, resulted in a set of economic and political compromises and understandings that 
has ultimately resulted in the weakening of the capacity of the central government to govern.[2]  
This is manifested in all realms, from economic arrangements, local and regional governmental 
structures, and a political party system that is regionally based and operates on regional 
dynamics. The result of this set of understandings and arrangements has been a tendency 
towards political paralysis.  
For example, the four major political parties are split half and half between the coast and the 
sierra, and from this core basis the remaining political parties are equally disaggregated. This lack 
of integration follows through in the central political institutions, to include the executive and the 
judiciary, with the result that barring agreement or consensus, demanding a very high level of 
negotiations, they do not function effectively. Indeed, based on the demands of ongoing 
negotiations, virtually all aspects of government, running through the judiciary and the executive, 
are highly politicized.  
With the coming into production of the oil fields in the Amazon region in the early1970s, the 
problems, if anything, became more serious. While on the one hand the dramatic increase in 
funds becoming available allowed the government in Quito to expand in size and penetration. But, 
it also allowed the central government to go into serious debt on the basis of overoptimistic 
expectations of the influx of resources. Thus, paradoxically the increased resources didn’t 
strengthen the national government, but instead—ironically, and consistent with the previous 
institutional arrangements—weakened it. And, the government in Quito, unwilling and probably 
unable to respond due to its need for resources, has so far rejected the demands for increased 
autonomy and resources for the two Amazon provinces of Sucumbios and Orellana, thereby 
resulting in escalating demands for autonomy and even violence. The disturbances in the oil-
producing region in August 2005 caused a loss of $84 million just for Petroecuador.[3] 
Due in large part to the political bargain keeping the central state weak, and aggravated by 
foreign indebtedness exacerbated by rising expectations over petroleum wealth, Ecuador 
suffered an extremely serious economic “meltdown” in 1999—causing serious social and political 
disruption. The banking system was intervened by the government, bank accounts were frozen, 
and large sectors of the population were seriously hurt. If there weren’t already enough economic 
reason to leave, following this economic disaster a very large number of people—500,000 or four 
percent of the population—had already left five years ago, mainly to Spain and the United States, 
with the pace if anything increasing since then.[4]  
The political outcome was also serious in that President Jamil Mahuad, having taken office as 
president in August 1998, was forced to resign in January 2000. The election of Mahuad had 
followed 18 months of an interim government under Fabian Alarcon, as the then-elected 
president, Abdala Bucaram, was removed by the congress in February 1997—a mere six months 
after his election. It was alleged when removing him that he was both mentally unfit and had 
misappropriated $90 million of public funds.[5] 
Impediments to Democratic Consolidation 
The political transition from military to civilian rule in 1979 has yet to result in democratic 
consolidation. If—as the general consensus in comparative politics understands political 
consolidation as the acceptance of the democratic institutions and process as “the only game in 
town”—this is clearly not the case for Ecuador. By observing the behavior of the elite and talking 
with some of them, it is clear to me that they have not embraced democracy, and vast majority of 
the population are apathetic.[6] As can be seen in Table 1, between the transition in 1979 and 
2005, three democratically elected presidents concluded their terms of office, Jaime Roldos died 
accidentally, and three presidents were forced out of office. President Mahuad’s resignation in 
January 2000 during the economic meltdown was in response to the catalytic events combining 
an insurrection by indigenous peoples and an attempted coup by a sector of the armed forces.  
Table 1: Ecuador Governments, 1979-2001  
Period President 





81  Jaime Roldos  Election Accidental death  
May 81-Aug 
84  Osvaldo Hurtado  
Vice President, assumed 




Cordero    Term concluded  
Aug 88-Aug 
92  





Election Term concluded  
Aug 96-Feb 




98  Fabian Alarcon  Designation by Congress Term concluded  
Aug 98-Jan 




Vice President, assumed 
office 
  
One of those involved in the coup attempt was Colonel Lucio Gutierrez, who later founded his 
own political party and was democratically elected president in late 2002, and assumed office on 
January 15, 2003. President Gutierrez was elected on a leftist platform, with support from the 
lower classes and indigenous voters, but without the support of any of the four traditional parties. 
His personal party, the PSP, lost the support of the Pachakutik indigenous party in August 2003, 
leaving it with only 6 seats in the 100 member congress. By November 2004 he had formed a 
new coalition with support from his old political enemies, Bucaram’s Roldosista Party (PRE), even 
allowing the exiled Abdala Bucaran to return to Ecuador, and Alvaro Noboa’s National Action 
Institutional Renewal Party (PRIAN), which necessitated very serious compromises alienating 
other sectors of the population.  
In seeking to secure an extremely tenuous and contradictory political base, in the late Fall of 2004 
President Gutierrez dissolved the Supreme Court in direct violation of the Constitution, and other 
judicial and executive bodies, and then staffed them with his political cronies. He also generally 
utilized the state, its structures and resources, for personal gain and for the benefit of friends and 
relatives. Thus, rather than seeking to consolidate the democracy which brought him into power, 
despite his previous involvement in the coup attempt in January 2000, he accelerated its 
continuing decomposition and deconsolidation. 
At that time, in early 2005, in response to this deconsolidation and shameless abuse of power 
and corruption, there emerged a whole new phenomenon in Ecuador. The emergence of the 
“forajidas”, or bandits, as President Gutierrez termed them, in Quito beginning on April 13, 2005 
was an important series of events and processes indicating that the people of Quito were finally 
and totally fed up with not only President Gutierrez and his government, but also the total lack of 
credibility of the political parties and their leaders. They took action into their own hands during 
late April until mid-May 2005 as they appeared again and again on the streets of Quito 
demonstrating their total disgust with the political game as played by the parties and their leaders.  
The final decision to depose President Gutierrez was made in the Congress where, in a special 
session on April 20, 2005, the political parties opposed to him voted 62 to 0, in the 100 member 
unicameral Congress, to declare the presidency vacant on charges that the president had 
“abandoned his post” even though Gutierrez was in the presidential palace issuing statements 
that he would not resign. This ploy was similar to how President Abdala Bucaran was deposed in 
1997, for “mental incapacity.” Just after to the vote in the Congress, Admiral Victor Hugo Rosero, 
head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, announced that the armed forces formally withdrew their support 
from President Gutierrez.[7]  
What emerged, in short, was a bizarre mixture of the old, the political deals and maneuverings of 
the political parties, where all revolves around personalities and economic gain, along with 
popular and totally unstructured political mobilization on the streets—where the crowds estimated 
to total 50,000 were also clamoring for the dissolution of Congress—yet meeting once again with 
another traditional element which was the armed forces. In the same model as Mahuad who was 
forced to resign in January 2000 after an attempted coup by a military which would no longer 
support him, so it was on April 20th when the Joint Chiefs of Staff withdrew support from 
President Gutierrez and he had no option but to flee the country since the attorney general issued 
an arrest warrant for him. 
There was at this time, however, a new and more ominous dimension: a serious discussion within 
the military to create a civil-military group, or junta, to rule rather than turning over the 
government, as stipulated in the constitution, to the vice president. The dynamics involved in the 
removal of Gutierrez, and finally his replacement by Vice President Alfredo Palacios Gonzales, 
were very complicated. During at least five hours Palacios was without military protection, and 
was threatened by an unruly mob.[8] There was considerable give and take on this, and 
according to well-placed observers, it was resolved only when foreign governments made it clear 
that this would be unacceptable in view of the commitment to democracy by important allies and 
the OAS. 
The Continuing Vicious Circle of Illegitimacy and Political Paralysis 
With the background described above, especially that concerning the thinly veiled illegitimate 
actions in overthrowing three democratically elected presidents in the past eight years in which 
the armed forces were involved, it is no surprise that there is something of a vicious circle of 
illegitimate and self-perpetuating behavior. One of the local newspapers, the Hoy, includes daily 
on page 3a, clocks keeping track of the number of days, weeks, and months since the judicial 
components of the state had stopped functioning. Ecuador currently lacks the legal institutions to 
establish legitimate government processes. The government of President Palacios, arising as it 
did from the overthrow of President Gutierrez, and with elections scheduled for late 2006, is, not 
surprisingly, facing serious challenges. In reviewing the change of ministers, it seems obvious 
that most political energy is utilized in just keeping the ship of state afloat, and not in governing. In 
order to attempt to establish a legitimate basis, the government has put forth a plan for a national 
referendum on a new constitution. 
But, during the week of October 17th, one of the legal institutions that continued functioning, the 
Electoral Tribunal, found that it was not constitutional. Even in early 2006, they are still working 
on the instruments, such as elections and laws, whereby some democratic institutionalization can 
be achieved. The institutions have been unable to reform key structures as they are not operating, 
since no board of directors and/or chief executive has been designated. This is the case of the 
Attorney General, the Constitutional Tribunal, and until just recently the Supreme Court. In short, 
Ecuador is currently caught in a vicious circle that is not increasing legitimacy of the democratic 
government, but probably just the opposite. In this situation of institutional disintegration, the 
personal power of Leon Febres Cordero, historic leader of the Social Christian Party and 
President from 1984 to 1988, looms large. He wields tremendous power in the judicial system 
and to a great extent in the legislature. He is frequently referred to, even in public, as “el dueno 
del pais”—or owner of the country.[9] 
Civil-Military Relations in the Context of Governmental Instability 
The armed forces led the transition to civilian government in 1979, and there are minimal 
indications today that either the vast majority of the armed forces or the people of Ecuador want 
them back in power. Even so, in addition to the severe economic and political problems, there are 
also a series of very serious challenges regarding the armed forces and national security and 
defense. The Ecuador armed forces acquitted themselves well in the border conflict with Peru in 
1995. That issue was apparently fully resolved through negotiations in 1998. Today, in the 
context of non-traditional threats, things are not nearly so clear or positive. First of all, without the 
traditional territorial defense threat, there is a real question about their proper roles and missions.  
Several problems arise from this fact. First, they no longer receive a percentage of the funds from 
the sale of petroleum. Second, what they are faced with are the very complex and serious set of 
challenges that arise from their location bordering on Colombia with great implications on two 
issues. Ecuador serves as an avenue and a warehouse for drugs. This can only make for huge 
challenges in terms of how to size and situate the forces and keep them honest. Even more 
importantly, whereas in Colombia, and Peru with Sendero Luminoso, drugs are one of the main 
resources to fund the terrorism of all three of the insurgent groups—FARC, ELN, and AUC, in 
Ecuador there is no public willingness to recognize the likelihood that at least the FARC might be 
doing the same on the Ecuador side of the border as on the Colombian side. This despite the 
Ecuadoran military’s admission in 2003 that the FARC were using their territory as a place to rest 
and in January an important FARC leader, Simon Trinidad, was captured in Quito. That is, 
Ecuador is unwilling to either define the FARC as a terrorist organization or to be publicly 
supportive of Colombia in its fight against the FARC and the other two groups. This issue became 
very polemic in mid-2005 following an attack by the FARC on a Colombian army base in Teteye, 
near the Ecuadorian border, killing 22 soldiers. President Uribe alleged that the perpetrators had 
set out from Ecuador, and called on the government to exercise tighter control over the border, 
and even proposed carrying out joint counterinsurgency actions.[10]  
There are several reasons for the unwillingness to become involved in counterterrorist operations, 
and the most important is the calculation that if Ecuador were to define the FARC as terrorists, 
then they might become targets of their attacks. Then too, there is no consensus in Ecuador, and 
probably elsewhere in the region, that Colombia will be able to beat the FARC. So, although there 
are reports in the media about attacks and violence on the Northern border, government reaction 
has been to temporize. There are just too many factors involved, including the domestic politics of 
Colombia and U.S. policy in the region. Thus, while at least in the long run, the security of 
Ecuador depends on the security of Colombia, there is little beyond civil and military diplomacy 
that Ecuador can do to increase the security of the latter.[11]  
Civil-military relations in terms of both studies and influence by civilians in issues of national 
security and defense are fairly rudimentary in Ecuador. While there are probably a half dozen 
academic experts interested in these themes, they are located in different institutions and 
cooperation is slight.[12] The civilians, then, not in government are poorly situated to influence 
policy. Even more important, the engagement by civilians in the legislature, executive, and 
interest groups is minimal. As one of the academic experts states: “In any case the politicians 
accept that there is a quid pro quo in this arrangement [of military autonomy]: the military does 
not involve itself in the areas reserved for civilian power, and the civilians leave the military in 
peace in their areas of putative professional ‘expertise’.”[13]  
In short, civil-military relations in Ecuador, the relations of power between civilian officials and 
military officers, are distant. The civilians control the military only in the last instances; for the 
President, in terms of nominations and retirements; for the legislature in terms of budgets. And, to 
stress what is probably already obvious, the control is often used for political purposes. For 
example, in order to solidity his political base in the armed forces, and weaken his enemies, 
President Lucio Gutierrez diminished the size of the General and Admirals Council from 46 to 29 
members in 2003, and saw to the promotion of those officers he considered loyal to him during 
the next year.[14] The latter could also be in terms of laws and oversight. The congress has not 
passed any laws regarding the armed forces since the new constitution was passed in 1998. And, 
from what I can determine, they have no interest in oversight nor the staff or expertise to exercise 
it if there were such interest.  
The most prominent role of the armed forces in the context of the institutional disintegration of the 
political system has been to support, or finally to no longer support, the elected political leader. 
This happened during the ousting of Presidents Bucaram and Mahuad, and finally it also 
happened with President Gutierrez.[15] According to one of the most respected political analysts 
in Ecuador, who also researches on the armed forces, the Ecuadorian armed forces are the most 
active politically in the region. They are legitimate in the eyes of the population due to both their 
past “developmentalist" works as well as in contrast to the disoriented or goal-less civilian leaders. 
According to Bonilla, the armed forces, even after the ousting of Mahuad, have more prestige 
than even the Catholic Church or the media.[16]  
Despite the prestige of the armed forces in comparison to others, they still have a huge problem 
in that they really can’t deal with the biggest, and most obvious, security challenge—terrorism—
and at the same time are sucked into politics. President Lucio Gutierrez, although coming from 
the military, did little to develop or strengthen its institutions. In fact he personalized it through 
appointments of friends regardless of competence. And, the manner in which he was ousted just 
further weakened it, and kept it involved in politics. Since the armed forces were known to be 
deliberating on whether to allow Vice President Palacios to assume the presidency or not, and 
didn’t protect him from the crowds, he—not surprisingly—changed out the military high command 
shortly after taking office. Since his ouster there have been internal efforts in the military to reform 
and restructure.  
But now—since September of 2005, and mainly under the leadership of Minister of Defense 
Oswaldo Jarrin—the forces are making major efforts to establish the bases for restructuring and 
modernizing.[17] If they are able to make these reforms, they will be unique among state 
structures in breaking out of the archaic, semi-legal, and all but static morass of the past.[18] 
Conclusion 
Ecuador is a challenged—or as some have said, tumultuous—democracy in that while the military 
has not controlled the government since 1979, the political institutions of a civilian-led democracy 
are extremely weak and highly personalized. Consequently, democratically elected presidents are 
periodically forced from office, and the military is pulled in to play a passive or complicit role in 
what are clearly unconstitutional changes of power.  
Meanwhile, the armed forces are unable to respond to—or for that matter even clearly define—
what for many is the most obvious threat, which is drug-financed terrorist organizations. Before 
and after the most recent change of government, on April 20, 2005, large sectors of the 
population, mainly in Quito, became mobilized to demand both a change of government and an 
end to the personalized and self-serving system of political patronage.  
Many of the legal control mechanisms of a democracy are, as of early 2006, still not in place—
and it appears likely that for the rest of this year, until the elections in October, we'll see more of 
the same. 
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